The BIA has now 15 years of experience w ith the certification of complex electronic systems for safety-related ap p lica tio n s in the m achinery sector.
driven m anufacturing cells whose functionality can be changed easily by varying the input param eters. A new production cycle is introduced via bus systems without mechanical or electrical changes of the equipment. In consequence safety-related equipment also becomes more flexible and complex.
W hereas some standards still do not allow software driven systems for specific safety functions, things have recognizably changed for safety devices during the last 5 years:
• Light curtains, which are used for high integrity applications in m achinery today, mostly use program m able electronics.
• Laser scanners or safety Program m able Logic Controllers (PLCs) are increasingly used for area guarding, safe muting, or processing of the emergency stop. Printing machines use a complex network of PLCs, which can be com pared with a small chemical plant. The safety functions of reduced velocity, protection against unintended movements, or muting o f fences are realized using redundant PLC architectures.
Autom atically guided vehicles are used as cleaning machines in departm ent stores. The multiprocessor control systems process safety functions for collision protection and navigation. Cable excavators use 32-bit controllers for lifting 20 tons up to 60 m (see Figure 1) . The safety function of the load moment limitation is realized by a redundant processor configuration.
Robots and modern machining centres are equipped with fast numeric controllers, several processors for power drives (PD), and PLCs to fulfil their tasks. In new controls several safety functions (see Table 1 ) are executed using diverse redundant program m able electronic systems.
TABLE 1. Safety-Related M achine Functions for Machining Centres Safety Function Description
Safe stopping process Fastest stopping process of the Power Drive (PD) under m onitor ing of the Numerical Control (NC).
Safe standstill
No unexpected movements are possible.
Safe operational stop
The motor is under position control of the PD. The monitoring of unexpected movements is active in PD and NC. Fastest reaction in case of unexpected restart.
Safely reduced speed PD and NC supervise that the speed does not exceed certain risk dependent limits.
Safely limited distance PD and NC supervise that a certain defined relative distance is not violated by one of the axes.
Safely limited absolute position PD and NC supervise that a certain defined absolute position is not violated by one of the axes.
All these examples cannot be fully tested and the failure modes are not completely defined. F or the described safety functions a standard EN 954-1:1997 (European Committee for Standardization [CEN], 1997) requirem ent like "If the detection of a fault is not possible, then an accum ulation o f faults shall not lead to a loss of the safety function" is not totally achievable.
This introduction shows that software-driven highly complex systems are becoming m ore and m ore state-of-the-art in the machinery sector. The BG Institute for Occupational Safety (Berufsgenossenschaftliches Institut fur Arbeitssicherheit [BIA] , in German) has been certifying such systems for m ore than 15 years; during the last 8 years on the basis of the G erm an prestandard D IN Y YDE 0801:1990 (Deutsches Institut fiir N orm ung [DIN], 1990) . This paper will describe the certification p ro cedure using as an example the testing and certification of a control system of machining centres. The following section will first illustrate the safety functions for machining centres, whereas section 3 describes in eight steps the systematic approach used by the BIA.
SAFETY FUNCTIONS FOR MACHINING CENTRES

Machining Centres: Concept and Scope
M achining centres are used for cutting cold metal work material. A m achining centre is a numerically controlled machine tool where the spindle orientation is usually either horizontal or vertical; it is capable of carrying out two or m ore machining processes (e.g., milling, drilling, boring), and it has facilities to enable tools to be changed automatically from a tool magazine or similar storage unit in accordance with the m a chining program m e (D raft Standard N o. prEN 12417:1997; CEN , 1997) .
M achining centres are operated in different modes. One m ode is the autom atic production of workpieces where normally all safety guards are closed. A nother m ode is the setting mode of the machine where all or some protection guards are open. In this mode the user has to work close to the movements of the machine axes. F o r the setting mode the machine control has to prevent or to guide these m otions so that they can be estimated by the worker. A ground plan of a machine tool (Figure 2) shows two safety-related areas: tool magazine and operational area. Several times a day the user has to enter the operational area. The magazine is only im portant for the setup.
In the last 2 years, several German manufacturers have been interested in the certification of these Control Systems. The main reason is that the state-of-the-art m onitoring of dangerous machine movements does not achieve high availability and fast fault reaction (Umbreit & Zinken, 1995) . The G erm an authorities, therefore, require the restricted use of safety guards on the basis of the European Machinery Directive (Council Directive 89/392/EEC). The measures to achieve machinery safety are responsible for lower productivity. The example of an im portant German m anufacturer of turning machines shows the extent of the problem: A special turning machine works with 60 tools on a revolver tool device. The tool exchange is m ade manually by the user. The revolver is driven by a highly dynamic A lternating Current (AC) drive. In case o f a fault the revolver accelerates very fast (within some 10 ms) to an angle-velocity of 1500 rpm (rotations per minute). To change all tools the user has to open the safety guard, install a new tool, close the guard, rotate the revolver to the next tool-position, and so on, 60 times for all tools! This procedure results in a high unacceptance of safety requirements: The user will try to m anipulate the guard-locking device for the sake of m ore ergonomic working conditions, but with risk of losing hands in case of a fault in the control system. In a new approach safe m onitoring was integrated in numerical controllers to fulfil the m arket requirements o f flexible productivity: The user's claim is to work close to the machine m otions to watch, for example, the process for a highly expensive workpiece (Reinert & Schaefer, 1998) . In totally m anually controlled machines (e.g., small milling machines) such observation is possible because all movements are directly controlled by the user. If the autom atic m otion is controlled in a safe way, the user can also move inside defined areas. All these areas in space and also in velocity space can be observed by an integrated m onitoring, realised by safe software only. In a highly flexible way the machine can be adapted to the work of the user and not vice versa. The safety functions realized by the integrated m onitoring are listed in Table 1 .
Hazards in Machining Centres
M achining centres present a wide range of hazards, not least because of their wide application as a rotating tool and "stationary" workpiece machine tools, for the general purpose of cutting cold metal w ork material. Protection of operators and other persons from contact with moving cutting tools, especially when being rapidly rotated in the spindle, or being swung from a tool magazine to the spindle during pow er-operated tool changing, or from contact with fast-moving w ork pieces, is of great importance. W hen power-operated mechanisms are provided for workpiece transfer, they can also create hazardous situ ations during loading/unloading and workpiece alignment or clamping (D raft Standard N o. prE N 12417:1997; CEN , 1997) .
Based on the methodology and the catalogue given in standard EN 1050 (CEN, 1996) , the draft standard prEN 12417:1997 (CEN, 1997) for machining centres lists 19 groups of hazards with 30 individual hazard ous situations. This C standard gives a detailed description of the hazardous situations, the operating modes, and associated activities where these situations may occur and the hazardous zones related to each hazard.
In chapter 5 of draft standard prEN 12417:1997 (CEN, 1997) requirem ents and measures that are necessary to prevent the individual hazards are discussed. Besides, three operating modes are referred to. A dditionally m entioned is the movement of machine axes for emergency purposes (e.g., release of trapped persons), which could be understood as a fourth operating mode.
Safety Functions
The safety functions listed in Table 1 can be defined especially for the modes " setting" and "m anual intervention under restricted operating conditions." F or the different safety functions different categories ac cording to standard EN 954-1:1997 954-1: (CEN, 1997 are required by draft standard prE N 12417:1997 (CEN, 1997; see Table 2 ). Table 2 attributes category (CAT) 3 to all of the safety functions of Table 1 . According to standard EN 954-1:1997 (CEN, 1997) " Safetyrelated parts of control systems according to category 3 shall be designed so that a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to the loss of the safety function. Whenever reasonably practicable the single fault shall be detected at or before the next dem and upon the safety function." The requirem ent of fault tolerance tow ards a single failure will be achieved by the following architecture. Figure 3 shows a typical architecture of a machine tool Control System. In these systems several computers are implemented for functional reasons. The Numerical Control (NC) is responsible for powerful calculation processes (e.g., complex interpolations in space); the digital Power Drives (PDs) have to control the m otions of the axes. Numerical Control and Power Drive System form a natural diverse redundant computer-based system. Normally the process interfaces are not redundant. To achieve a totally redundant control the only hardw are changes are extensions to the input and output interfaces for sensors (e.g., rotational sensors, guard switches, control switches) and actuators (e.g., guard locking, relays, and final switching devices). All safety-related functions can be implemented within these two channels by software. Figure 3 shows that the com bination of N C and PDs of each machine axis forms a diverse redundant control system. The redundancy fulfils the require ment that no single fault leads to a danger. This architecture does not fulfil the requirement of fault detection whenever reasonably practicable. This requirement was covered by cross m onitoring and forced dynamisation.
New Architectures for Safety
PD and N C simultaneously calculate the safety-related values. All safety-related param eters of the control system have to be m onitored in both channels. Cross m onitoring happens not only in the N C but also in the PD. To achieve a good diagnostic coverage, cross m onitoring is not only restricted to comparing output signals but it has to com pare a lot of interm ediate results inside the controllers. These results are, for example, position values, speed values, input and output values, safety-related machine param eters. F o r all these m onitoring functions special tests were conducted to validate their presence and correct function. All tests are carried out m anually at a real simulation station to guarantee that the conditions are close to the practice. M ore than 100 test cases were constructed during the careful analysis of the design docum ents to prove the system reaction under real-time conditions. For every test case, the system reaction was m onitored and documented.
To detect failures in the signal processing of static inputs by cross monitoring, the signal m ust change for a test within the so-called fault recognition time. For example, the input signal of the emergency stop, which is connected to N C and PD, changes only on demand. If these two channelled input signals change at every standstill of the machine for a short time, PD and N C could monitor (cross monitoring) this test and react in case of differences. This mechanism is called "forced dynamisation."
The m ain im portant m otion sensors are the rotational sensors of each axis. Norm ally all electronic parts of the safety related Control System have to be redundant. For high dynamic signal change it is possible to reduce the num ber of rotational sensors to only one. Therefore, fault-detection has to be m ade in a highly dynamical way by two channels, N C and PD (see Figure 3) . Figure 3 also shows an example for safe pulse blocking. The m ain features are the two channelled stopping paths and the stopping via switch-off of the opto-couplers, which transm it the pulses to the end stage of the PD. Both channels are able to stop the movement of the axes simultaneously.
SYSTEMATIC CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
Review of the Specification
Special effort was put into the validation of the specification. Especially the following points were investigated:
• Does the requirement specification deal in a correct, clear, unequivocal, and consistent way with every safety-relevant function, which will be implemented, the external interfaces, the man-machine interface, the internal interfaces, the initialisation procedure, the reaction in case of power failure and restart, the presupposed operational conditions, the internal self-tests and reactions to detected faults, the border conditions for software due to hardw are restrictions, and the software codex to be fulfilled? • Are the docum entation rules adequate for the application?
• Is the specification of a form that it can be understood by developers and programmers?
• Is there an adequate process to control changes in the specification? • Are development tools used by the manufacturer?
These formal aspects were approved by two safety experts sim ulta neously. All recognised problems were discussed in about 20 review sessions with an average duration of 2 days. Figure 4 shows an example of the docum entation of the review sessions. This docum entation was m ade by the m anufacturer and checked by the BIA. It was the basis for changes in the specification. The changes in the specification were checked by the BIA, too. 
Design Review and Test Case Specification
Besides the validation of the specification, project organisation (proof of the formal mechanisms in the m anufacturer's organisation), docum enta tion (approval of design documents and m anuals, reviews with machine m anufacturers as users of the N C and PD), and functional tests (test of all safety-related machine functions with different com binations) were subjects of the approval. Several reviews of the design documents led to more than 100 test cases for systematic testing and some m inor changes in the design.
Statical Analysis
In several recursive steps soft-and hardw are of the N C and the PD , which are both diverse redundant, were analysed by safety experts. Because o f the diverse redundant architecture only m inor changes were found in the hardware. The safety software o f N C and PD were statically analysed by a static analyser. Both source codes have the typical extent o f about 1000-2000 instructions. In Table 3 , the m ain results of the statical analysis are represented for two versions of the PD software and one version of the N C software by listing the main metrics (Dumke, 1992) . The third version of the PD software shows some dram atic changes in the average num ber of statements, average p ro gramme length and cyclomatic num ber (M cCabe, 1976) . These changes are the results of the first software verifications. Every weak point o f the software, as pointed out by the metrics, was investigated in greater detail. 
Walk-Throughs
The analyses were accompanied by several walk-through sessions of the software. The correct and complete realisation of the requirement specifica tions and the software codex of the m anufacturer in the software was checked during the walk-throughs. Figure 5 shows the standardized docum entation of the walk-through sessions. These walk-through minutes have been draw n up by the BIA. The walk-throughs showed several failures in the PD software. The structure of this software was changed also due to the statical analysis. Today the software of PD and N C is written in a structured way. . S a n k t A u g u a tln r. S c h m itt*la , F a . S to m a n a D r. S c h a e fe r, B IA
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Systematic Tests
D uring the reviews of the specification and the design docum entation, the statical analysis, and the walk-throughs, several test cases were gene rated. Figure 6 shows the BIA's standardized test case docum entation. D uring the generation of the test cases the upper four points were edited into files. These files were then sent to the m anufacturer, who prepared the test cases according to the requirements. During several 3-day sessions all test cases were executed in the presence of the BIA experts. The documentation of the tests was directly made during the tests by the BIA. The execution o f the test cases revealed a serious fault in the redundant architecture: Some Input/O utput (I/O) inform ation could be blocked by a high priority interrupt of the N C channel so that the m achine could move with full speed with opened guards. The fault was corrected using additional software algorithms in both channels. 
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EMI and Environmental Testing
The robustness of the safety-related system towards expected operating stresses and external influences was checked by means of Electro M agnetic Compatibility (EMC) tests, mechanical shock and vibration testing, Isolation Protection (IP) rate testing, and climatic tests. These tests were conducted by accredited laboratories of the m anufacturer and the complete test documentation was checked by safety experts of the BIA.
Site-Acceptance Tests
An installation m anual, which described in detail the installation p ro cess, was checked. A complete test was required after installation of the safety-related system. A more than 100-page document describes the operating conditions using the software driven safety functions (see Table 1 ). D uring a site acceptance test (see Figure 7 ) the safety experts checked the use of the installation m anual by the machine m anufacturer. Necessary changes were implemented after the first meetings together with the machine manufacturer. 
Modification Procedures
After the first certification both controls were changed several times because of user requests. All modifications were documented according to the BIA 's requirements. Figure 8 shows an example of a modification in the N C software.
The old and new version numbers were clearly documented. The affected programmes were listed and a verbal description of the modifica tion was made. The origin of the modification request was documented. In several enclosures the listings of the modified code are given together with the code w alk-throughs after the modification. Each modification was signed by the software engineer and certified after testing by the BIA. 
C O N C LU S IO N S
This paper shows that machinery safety can be achieved using C stand ards, which are application-specific, and the requirements of standard , 1998) will be used instead of the G erm an prestandard. M ost of the procedures are identical if a link between requirem ent classes and safety integrity levels can be established. Per definition, a link between category 2, 3, and 4 and safety integrity level 1, 2, and 3 can be established at least for measures against systematic failures.
